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1. Introduction 27 
 28 
Recent research has shown how explicitly modelling the network structure of social and economic 29 
relations can provide significant theoretical insights, as well as account for previously unexplained 30 
empirical observations. Relevant areas of application range from labour markets (Calvo-Armentgol, 31 
2004; and Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004), to the diffusion of opinions and diseases (Jackson 32 
and Yaariv, 2011), trade and financial markets (Eliott, Golub and Jackson, 2013), R&D 33 
collaborations (Goyal and Moraga Gonzales, 2001), friendship and peer effects identification 34 
(Currarini, Jackson and Pin, 2009, 2010), and the adoption of health related behaviours (Christakis 35 
and Fowler, 2002). 36 
Network theory is particularly well-suited to analysing problems where social distance affects 37 
the nature and extent of economic interactions. In a network, agents interact only with a subset of 38 
other agents called the neighbours. For instance, in labour markets, information on job vacancies 39 
mainly flows along social ties. Likewise, people’s behaviours and habits are affected by those of 40 
friends, relatives and colleagues with whom they interact, whom they imitate, and whose actions 41 
have an impact on their welfare. Research in network economics has addressed two distinct, though 42 
strictly related, issues: (i) how network structures affect the behaviour of social and economic 43 
actors; (ii) what incentives agents face in forming the network by means of link creation and 44 
deletion (which in turn begs the question how these incentives relate to social incentives, and how 45 
efficient are the resulting architectures). Investigation of the above issues has shown that the 46 
network structure of career advice can generate unemployment patterns that match the observed 47 
correlation and persistence of unemployment much better than classical models do (e.g., Calvo-48 
Armengol and Jackson, 2004, Calvo-Armengol, 2004). Furthermore, we have learned that the effect 49 
of changing the topology of a social network crucially depends on the strategic features of social 50 
interactions (i.e. whether they are substitutes or complements) (e.g., Galeotti et al., 2010); and that 51 
the ethnic biases in the way students form friendships originate both from institutional constraints 52 
and from preferences that are not race-blind but favour one’s own ethnic group (e.g., Currarini, 53 
Jackson and Pin (2009)). 54 
Local interactions and network structures appear to be a prominent feature of many 55 
environmental problems. Without having the ambition to be exhaustive, this paper nonetheless 56 
considers a wide range of issues and potential areas of application, including: (i) the role of 57 
relational networks in the pattern of adoption and the speed of diffusion of green technologies; (ii) 58 
common pool resource problems characterized by a multiplicity of sources and users interlinked by 59 
an extraction network; (iii) the role of social networks in multi-level environmental governance; (iv) 60 
infrastructural networks in the access to and use of natural resources such as oil and natural gas; (v) 61 
the use of networks to describe the internal structure of inter-country relations in international 62 
agreements, and how this affects the stability of cooperation; and (vi) the formation of bilateral 63 
“links” in the process of building up an environmental coalition.  64 
For each of these areas, we examine why and how network economics would be an effective 65 
conceptual and analytical tool, and discuss the main insights that we can foresee. We do this by 66 
reviewing relevant yet still limited contributions within this emerging research field, discussing new 67 
frameworks of analysis, and identifying open issues and questions for future research. 68 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the fundamental elements of network 69 
analysis, and presents some of the key indices that are used to capture the structural features of a 70 
network and compare different architectures. Furthermore, it discusses how the network is likely to 71 
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affect agents’ actions, behaviours and welfare; and what forces/incentives are behind the process of 72 
network formation. In section 3 we seek to map the linkages between network economics and the 73 
environment by focusing on specific environmental issues/areas and analysing in greater detail how 74 
the use of networks can provide new insights for both theory and practice. Section 4 draws some 75 
conclusions. 76 
 77 
 78 
2 Network Economics: Key Features and Concepts 79 
 80 
In this section we introduce some fundamental concepts and notations about networks. For a more 81 
complete and detailed treatment we refer the reader to Jackson (2008). 82 
 83 
2.1 Definitions 84 
 85 
Networks 86 
 87 
We define a network starting from a set N of nodes. In applications, nodes usually represent socio 88 
economic agents, such as firms, consumers, countries, etc… A network g can be defined as a subset 89 
of the set of all pairs of elements in N: ݃ ⊆ ሼ݆݅: ݅ ∈ ܰ, ݆ ∈ ܰሽ. When the order of pairs matters, we 90 
say the network is directed, otherwise we say that the network is undirected (that is, in an 91 
undirected network ݆݅ ∈ ݃ ⟶ ݆݅ ∈ ݃). A pair ݆݅ ∈ ݃ is called a link or a tie. Although links can 92 
carry an associated real number, which is usually interpreted as the strength of the link, in most 93 
economic applications such weights are set to either 1 (the link is there) or 0 (the links is absent), 94 
and ݃ is a non-weighted network. We will denote by ݃ െ ݆݅ the network obtained by deleting the 95 
link ݆݅ from ݃, and by ݃ ൅ ݆݅ the network obtained by adding the link ݆݅ to ݃.  96 
An alternative way to represent a network is by means of the adjacency matrix G, whose generic 97 
entry ݃௜௝  measures the strength of the link between nodes i and j in g. When the network is 98 
undirected, the adjacency matrix is symmetric; when links are not weighted, the matrix only 99 
contains zeros and ones. The generic element ݃௜௝௠ of the ݉ െ ݐ݄ power of the matrix G counts how 100 
many paths of length ݉ are present in ݃ between ݅ and ݆. 101 
The neighbourhood of node ݅ in the non-weighted network ݃ is the set of nodes that are linked 102 
to ݅ in ݃. The number of such nodes – called the neighbours of ݅ – is called the degree of ݅ in ݃. If 103 
all nodes are linked to all other nodes we have the complete network. Notable architectures include 104 
(i) minimally connected networks (trees); (ii) regular networks, where all nodes have the same 105 
degree (a special case is the circle, where all nodes have two neighbours); and (iii) core-periphery 106 
architectures, which are networks where a subset of nodes – the core – is linked to all nodes in the 107 
network and the rest of the nodes are only linked to nodes in the core (a special case is the star, 108 
where the core includes a single node). See figure 1. 109 
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 110 
 111 
Paths and Connectedness 112 
 113 
A walk in the network ݃ is a sequence of adjacent links in ݃. Formally, a walk is a sequence 114 
ሼ݅଴݅ଵ, ݅ଵ݅ଶ, … , ݅௠ିଵ݅௠ሽ	 such that ݅௣ିଵ݅௣ ∈ ݃ for all ݌ ൌ 1,… ,݉. When such walk exists, we say that 115 
the two nodes ݅଴, ݅௠ are connected in ݃. A walk such that ݅଴ ൌ ݅௠ is called a cycle. When the walk 116 
never goes twice through the same node we have a path. When there are several paths connecting 117 
nodes ݅଴	ܽ݊݀	݅௠, we consider the shortest of these paths to define the geodesic distance between 118 
݅଴	ܽ݊݀	݅௠ as the number of links in this shortest path. We say that the network ݃ is connected if for 119 
each pair of nodes there exists a connecting path.  120 
 121 
Sub-networks and Components 122 
 123 
A sub-network ݄ ⊂ ݃ is a network with set of nodes ܵ ⊆ ܰ and such that ݆݅ ∈ ݄ ⟶ ݆݅ ∈ ݃. For any 124 
subset ܵ ⊂ ܰ we define the restriction of ݃ to ܵ as the sub-network with set of nodes ܵ and with the 125 
links in ݃ that only involve nodes in ܵ. The restriction of ݃ to ܵ is denoted by ݃|ௌ. We say that the 126 
subset of nodes ܵ ⊂ ܰ is connected in g if ݃|ௌ is connected. A maximal connected sub-network of 127 
݃ is called a component of ݃. By definition, a component ݄ of ݃ is such that no link is present in ݃ 128 
between nodes in the component and nodes outside the component. Each component ݄ ⊂ ݃ 129 
identifies a subset of nodes N(h)	⊆ ܰ; it is clear that ܰሺ݄ሻ ∩ ܰሺ݄ᇱሻ ൌ ∅ and that ⋃ ܰሺ݄ሻ ൌ ܰ௛ . 130 
The partition of N defined by all subsets ܰሺ݄ሻ  is denoted by ߨሺ݃ሻ . So if, for instance, ݃ ൌ131 
ሼ12,23,45ሽ , then there are two components, ݄ଵ ൌ ሼ12,23ሽ  and ݄ଶ ൌ ሼ45ሽ , and ߨሺ݃ሻ ൌ132 
ሼሼ123ሽ, ሼ45ሽሽ.  133 
 134 
2.2 Representing Networks 135 
 136 
Networks are mathematically complex structures. Yet, we can capture some basic structural 137 
properties and compare different networks by looking at simple indices, whose qualitative features 138 
are briefly described below. 139 
Tree Circle Star 
Figure 1 Examples of network 
architectures 
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Connectivity and Cohesion 141 
 142 
A first basic question is how connected or dense a network is. A first, rough measure is given by the 143 
number of links in the network; to be able to compare networks of different sizes, one looks at the 144 
average degree; that is, the average number of neighbours nodes have. It is clear that networks with 145 
similar number of nodes may present very different topologies, which we would naturally associate 146 
with different measures of density. For instance, one may be interested in how far any randomly 147 
picked pair of nodes is in the network – the average distance. A different type of information is 148 
given by the diameter of a network, the maximal geodesic distance between any two nodes. If for 149 
instance, the diameter of g is 6, it means that it takes at most 6 steps to go from any node to any 150 
other node in the network. 151 
Another related feature is network cohesiveness, which aims at capturing how firmly together a 152 
group of nodes is in the network. Obviously, adding links to a given network can only increase any 153 
reasonable measure of cohesiveness. This is, of course, very different from saying that a larger 154 
number of links means that a network is more cohesive. To make things clear, consider a star 155 
network and a circle. In the star, the removal of a single node is enough to break up the network in 156 
two separate components. In the circle, it takes at least two nodes to do it. This can be interpreted as 157 
a higher cohesiveness of the circle relative to the star. In general, we can define a cut-set for the 158 
connected network g as a set of nodes that, if removed from g, would break up g into two or more 159 
components. The minimal cardinality of cut-sets of g is the smallest number of nodes that would 160 
suffice to break up connectedness of g. A common measure of cohesiveness for g is then the 161 
cardinality of the smallest cut-set. A similar measure can be applied to any connected subgraph of 162 
g, measuring therefore how cohesive a sub-group of nodes is in g. A celebrated result in graph 163 
theory states that if k is such minimal size for g, then there exist, for any pair of nodes, at least k 164 
connecting paths with empty intersection. This property relates this measure of cohesiveness with a 165 
measure of diversification of communication flows between agents in the network. One may also be 166 
interested in the vulnerability of a network to the removal of subsets of nodes that are themselves 167 
connected in the network. This is an important issue, for instance, if the possibility of such removal 168 
is somehow related to some flow of information between nodes in the subset. We can then define a 169 
connected cut-set for g as a cut-set which is internally connected in g. Consistently, we can redefine 170 
a measure of cohesiveness based on minimal connected cut-sets (see sections 3.3 and 3.4 for 171 
applications of these concepts). 172 
 173 
Clustering 174 
 175 
Within a network, two neighbours of a given node may or may not be themselves neighbours. 176 
When they are, they “close” the triangle of relationships by forming a “cluster”. The degree of 177 
clustering may vary greatly across networks, depending on the nature of the relations described by 178 
links. In a hierarchical organization, for instance, clustering is very low, while in friendships 179 
clustering tend to be quite high, since common friends often become friends themselves. A measure 180 
of how clustered a network is looks at all the potential triangles in the networks (a node with two 181 
neighbours) and counts the fraction of times that such triangles are actually closed; a slightly 182 
different measure takes this fraction for each node in the network, and then averages across all 183 
nodes. 184 
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Modularity 186 
 187 
Modularity measures quantify the extent to which the network is partitioned into separate subgroups 188 
of nodes, which should be considered as “communities” with little inter-connections and dense 189 
intra-connections. These measures (see Scott, 2000, pp. 126-145, for a discussion) involve 190 
procedures of hierarchical clustering. The degree of network modularity is important, for instance, 191 
for the consequences, in terms of aggregate diffusion, of shocks that affect a single community of 192 
nodes, or individual nodes. As Golub and Jackson (2012) have shown, homophily and assortative 193 
matching, by inducing strong modularity in social ties, can slow down the process of diffusion of 194 
information within the network. Hence, local differences tend to persist and society fails to 195 
converge to a uniform set of beliefs. 196 
 197 
Centrality 198 
 199 
Nodes in a network may have different degrees of “importance” in connecting other nodes. For 200 
instance, a node may be critical in the sense that by removing it from the network, the other nodes 201 
would split into two or more components. Or a node may be important because many of the shortest 202 
paths that connect the other nodes pass through that single node. Or, still, because it is very close to 203 
all other nodes in the network, or to the most important nodes in the network. 204 
Centrality indices have the scope of formally quantifying the importance of nodes in the 205 
network. A first basic way to think of centrality is to simply consider how many connections a node 206 
has – that is, taking a node's degree (possibly normalized by the total number of nodes if one wishes 207 
to compare centrality in different networks). Other notions of centrality make use of more global 208 
information about the position of nodes in the network. Closeness centrality measures how close a 209 
node is to all other nodes in the network, and is given by the inverse of the sum of a node's 210 
distances from all other nodes. Betweeness centrality measures how important a node is in 211 
efficiently connecting other nodes in the network; for a given node ݅ this index is given by the 212 
fraction of shortest paths between any two nodes k and j that go through node ݅ . Eigenvalue 213 
centrality accounts for the type of connections that a node has in the network; it is based on the 214 
(recursive) idea that central nodes are those connected to other central nodes. Finally, Bonacich 215 
centrality counts all walks that depart from a given node in the network, discounting longer walks 216 
by an exponential factor. 217 
Recent work on strategic behaviour in networks has shown that centrality correlates with agents’ 218 
behaviour when actions exert local peer effects (see Ballester et al, 2006). This is due to the large 219 
exposure of central agents to the positive feedbacks coming from peer effects. When actions also 220 
generate local negative externalities in the form, for instance, of passive smoke or transboundary 221 
pollution, the relation between centrality and behaviour becomes more complex, and more intense 222 
behaviour can move towards the periphery of the network (see Currarini et al., 2014 and, for 223 
empirical evidence on smoking, Christakis and Fowler, 2002).  224 
 225 
Degree Distributions 226 
 227 
While centrality describes features of single nodes as a function of the whole network, other 228 
measures aim at capturing features of the overall distribution of links in the network. The degree 229 
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distribution of a network provides information about the fraction of nodes that have any given 230 
degree in the network. Mathematically, it associates each possible degree d (from 0 to n - 1, where n 231 
is the total number of nodes) with the fraction of nodes with degree d in the network under 232 
consideration. It must be noted that although the degree distribution provides useful information on 233 
how evenly distributed connections are in a network (whether, for instance, the network has a 234 
considerable fraction of nodes that act as hubs and of nodes that are poorly connected or, 235 
alternatively, all nodes have more or less the same degree), this measure is silent about other 236 
characteristics such as clustering. Figure 2 gives an example of two networks with the same degree 237 
distribution (degenerate, with all agents having degree of 2), but quite different architectures in 238 
terms of connectivity and clustering. 239 
 240 
 241 
 242 
 243 
 244 
A benchmark degree distribution is the Poisson distribution, which approximates the expected 245 
degree distribution in a purely random network where each link forms with the same given 246 
exogenous probability. The fraction of nodes with degree d under the Poisson distribution is 247 
ܲሺ݀ሻ ൌ ߤௗ ௘షഋௗ!  . Real world networks tend to violate independence and uniform randomness in the  248 
formation of links, and often exhibit scale free (or power law) distributions, characterized by fatter 249 
lower and upper tails compared to the Poisson. Under a scale free distribution, the fraction of agents 250 
with degree d is given by ܲሺ݀ሻ ൌ ܿ݀ିఊ (see figure 3). The parameter c shifts the expected degree of 251 
the distribution, while the parameter ߛ affects the curvature (smaller values generate fatter tails). As 252 
it can be easily checked, the relative frequency of two different degrees is invariant to the 253 
multiplication of both degrees by a common factor (or scale), from which the term “scale free”. 254 
Such fat tails are generated in models of growing random network where more connected nodes 255 
face better chances to form further links with newly born nodes (as in the preferential attachment 256 
model by Barabasi, 1999).  257 
 258 
 259 
 260 
 261 
 262 
(i) (ii) 
Figure 2 Clustering and degree distributions  
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 264 
 265 
 266 
 267 
  268 
 269 
2. 3 Welfare, Behaviour and Network Formation 270 
 271 
2.3.1 Network Games, Allocation Rules and Efficient Networks 272 
 273 
The patterns of social interaction are likely to affect agents’ behaviour, aggregate welfare and 274 
welfare distribution. The traditional models of game theory, in which every agent typically interacts 275 
with everyone else, have been extended to encompass the structure of local interactions described 276 
by the network. In particular, in graphical games, agents are assumed to only interact with their 277 
neighbours in the network, whose actions directly enter their payoff function. However, equilibrium 278 
feedbacks are present also between agents who are only indirectly connected in the network, and 279 
each agent’s equilibrium behaviour ends up depending on the entire architecture rather than only on 280 
her neighbourhood. Two broad classes of graphical games are: (i) games with strategic 281 
complements, where an agent’s incentives to act increase with the number (or the share) of 282 
neighbours taking the action; (ii) games with strategic substitutes, where incentives to act decrease 283 
with the number (or share) of neighbours taking the action. Strategic complements well describe 284 
settings where conformism, imitation or other economic mechanisms correlate agents’ behaviour 285 
with their neighbours’; substitutes represent problems where incentives to free ride are present, and 286 
agents substitute their own (costly) action with their neighbours’.  287 
In large networks, agents may have limited knowledge of the overall architecture beyond their 288 
neighbourhood. The class of network games, studied in Galeotti et al. (2010), captures this 289 
incomplete information aspect by assuming that only the overall degree distribution of the network 290 
is common knowledge, and each agent privately knows her own degree, and formulates 291 
expectations about her neighbours’ degrees and behaviour. Within this framework, it is possible to 292 
draw sharp conclusions about the implications of changes in the network’s topology on agents’ 293 
behaviour in the classes of games with strategic complements and substitutes. 294 
Figure 3 Poisson and Scale Free distributions for a network with 60 nodes and 
average degree of 24. Parameters are c ൌ 24.4, ߛ ൌ 3 , ߤ ൌ 24 . A detailed 
picture of the upper tails is provided. 
 9
Using a reduced form approach in line with the cooperative games tradition, we can associate 295 
with each network ݃ a value function ݒ expressing the total welfare generated by agents in the 296 
network. The real number ݒሺ݃ሻ can be thought as the sum of agents payoffs in a game played on ݃, 297 
or as the social “pie” that is generated in ݃ and that must be distributed among agents. Individual 298 
payoffs are represented by an allocation rule ܽሺݒ, ݃ሻ , a vector-valued function mapping each 299 
economic problem (a pair ݒ, ݃) into a distribution of the value ݒሺ݃ሻ. A network ݃∗ is said to be 300 
efficient with respect to ݒ if it maximizes the size of the pie to be distributed: ݃∗ ൌ ܽݎ݃݉ܽݔ௚ݒሺ݃ሻ.  301 
 302 
2.3.2 Link Formation, Stability and Efficiency 303 
 304 
The way in which the allocation rule ܽሺݒ, ݃ሻ distributes the total pie among agents determines 305 
agents’ incentives to form and sever links. For instance, agent ݅ (node ݅) in network ݃ will have an 306 
incentive to form the link ݆݅ ∉ ݃ if her payoff, as determined by the rule ܽሺݒ, ݃ሻ, would increase in 307 
݃ ൅ ݆݅  compared to ݃ . Any notion of stability of a network refers to such incentives, and is 308 
therefore defined with respect to the pair ሺݒ, ܽሻ. Depending on agents’ strategic possibilities to 309 
revise their links we obtain various notions of stability.  310 
One first important issue is whether agents can form links without the consent of their 311 
perspective partners. This modelling choice clearly depends on the specific economic problem one 312 
has in mind, and in particular on whether links are directed or undirected. If links represent 313 
literature citations or Internet page referrals, unilateral link formation is an appropriate assumption. 314 
Mutual consent is instead required in international environmental agreements, information sharing, 315 
friendships, insurance, market agreements, co-authorship, and in many other socio-economic 316 
applications.  317 
A second issue is the extent to which agents are able to coordinate their decision to revise links. 318 
When links can be formed unilaterally, stability can be defined by directly applying the Nash 319 
equilibrium to a suitably defined link formation game. Coordination is instead a crucial issue when 320 
mutual consent is required to form a link, since individual actions are not capable of adding links to 321 
a network. The notion of pairwise stability (Jackson and Wolinsky 1996) assumes that agents can 322 
coordinate to form a profitable link: a stable network obtains when no pair of agents wishes to form 323 
a new link, and no agent wishes to (unilaterally) sever an existing link. Note that pairwise stability 324 
cannot be derived as the Nash equilibrium of a suitably defined link formation game, since: (i) 325 
agents can only sever one of their existing links, and (ii) pairs of agents can jointly deviate from a 326 
network by forming a new link. The notion of Nash-pairwise stability, allowing both the 327 
coordinated objection of pairs of agents and the severance of any number of an agent’s own 328 
connections, is instead a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. The even more demanding notion of 329 
strong stability (Jackson and van den Nouweland, 2005), assumes that any subset of agents can 330 
coordinate in the joint revision of their links, and possesses similar features to the strong Nash 331 
equilibrium of games in strategic form. 332 
Since an agent’s decisions to add or sever links potentially affect all other agents in the network 333 
(the so called network externalities), decentralized linking decisions are likely to lead to inefficient 334 
networks from a social point of view. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) have shown that network 335 
formation suffers indeed from a general tension between stability and efficiency. They show that no 336 
allocation rule ܽሺݒ, ݃ሻ that satisfies natural symmetry and anonymity properties guarantees that the 337 
efficient network will be pairwise stable. Given the limited amount of coordination required by the 338 
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pairwise stability notion, this result highlights a serious inconsistency between private and social 339 
incentives in network formation. Other contributions have proposed ways to overcome this tension, 340 
focusing on either mechanism design approaches (Dutta and Mututswami, 1997), or on Coase-like 341 
bargaining procedures (Currarini and Morelli, 2000), or still on general transfers schemes (Bloch 342 
and Jackson, 2007). When spillovers are present across components (a relevant case for 343 
environmental problems, where agents benefit and suffer from actions taken by other disconnected 344 
agents), efficiency generally requires the use of contingent transfers, which subsidize the formation 345 
or the deletion of those links that are responsible for the spillovers (see Bloch and Jackson, 2007). 346 
 347 
3 Mapping the Linkages between Network Economics and the Environment 348 
 349 
3.1  Diffusion and Evolution in Networks 350 
 351 
Many aspects of environmental economics and resource management problems are intrinsically 352 
dynamic. For example, natural resources are often stocks whose laws of motion are affected by both 353 
natural factors and human behaviours. The opinions, beliefs and incentives that determine 354 
environmental behaviours tend to evolve in time, and to spread through society according to 355 
dynamics that depend on the patterns of social connections.  356 
In this chapter we discuss the role of networks in our understanding of such dynamics, and provide 357 
a specific example of how networks have fruitfully enriched models of environmental behaviour. 358 
Although we treat “diffusion” and “evolution” separately, these phenomena are strictly related, and 359 
models are often formally equivalent.  360 
 361 
3.1.1 Diffusion of Green Technologies 362 
 363 
Diffusion is defined by Rogers (1995) as “the process by which an innovation is communicated 364 
through certain channels over time among the members of a social system”. The key terms in this 365 
definition are the novelty of the piece of information to be transmitted, and the role of social 366 
channels for this spread. Beliefs, infections, fashions and various kinds of behaviors spread through 367 
society in very much the same way as information does. Understanding the diffusion process is a 368 
central issue in environmental sciences to the extent that what spreads in society has a potential 369 
effect on natural resources and their management. This is the case, for instance, for the adoption of 370 
innovative technologies by firms (Conley and Udry, 2001), of green behaviour by consumers, as 371 
well as cooperative behaviour by signatories of an international environmental agreement (Heal and 372 
Kunreuther, 2012). 373 
The early models on diffusion (see Bass, 1969) neglect the local nature of interaction, and 374 
focus on the overall “rate of adoption” in society, whose dynamics are governed by the overall ratio 375 
of adopters and of non adopters at any point in time. The key insight from the Bass model is that 376 
diffusion follows a nonlinear trend, with first a fast acceleration and a subsequent slowdown (figure 377 
4, Young, 2009).  378 
 379 
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 380 
 381 
Although the Bass model contains no “micro-foundation” for the dynamics of the rate of adoption, 382 
similar nonlinear patterns of diffusion are obtained in models where agents optimally decide 383 
whether to adopt as a function of how many adopters are present in societies. Such models are built 384 
on the idea of strategic complementarities, where the incentives to adopt increase with the fraction 385 
of other agents adopting the innovation. Depending on the context, many definitions have been 386 
given to the idea that other people’s actions can reinforce one’s own choices: ‘bandwagon effects’ 387 
in fashion-oriented behaviour (Leibenstein, 1950), individuals’ adoption thresholds (Granovetter, 388 
1978), entrapment (Dixit, 2003), network externalities, social reinforcement, cascades (Watts, 389 
2002), tipping (Gladwell, 2000) and “positive feedback trading” in finance (Barberis and Shleifer, 390 
2003), among others. Empirical work relating to environmental problems has established the 391 
relevance of the S-shaped curve for the diffusion and adoption of new technologies. Ryan and 392 
Gross (1943) and Griliches (1957) demonstrated that the adoption of hybrid corn seeds among Iowa 393 
farmers follow the pattern presented in figure 4. More recently, Weir and Knight (2004) find a 394 
significant role of schooling, mediated by social networks, in the adoption and diffusion of 395 
innovations using data from Ethiopia. Specifically, they suggest that literate farmers are early 396 
adopters of new farming practices as well as quick at imitating innovations by others, while 397 
illiterate farmers tend to be second-movers and eventually adopt the practices of the innovators.  398 
The role of complementarities for diffusion is also central to works that study the presence of 399 
tipping point for the adoption of climate policies by the international community. Heal and 400 
Kunreuther (2012) offer illustrative evidence on the role of early adopters (i.e. those located at the 401 
left x-axis corner in figure 4) in triggering a global shift from damaging pollutants’ usage to greener 402 
alternatives. The first one concerns the adoption of unleaded gasoline in replacement of leaded 403 
gasoline; here the unilateral adoption by the United States meant that the subsequent adoption’s 404 
costs for other countries was confined to modifying refinery capacity, since motor industries 405 
exporting to the U.S. had to transition to lead-free fuel immediately after the move. Thanks to these 406 
reduced costs for the followers, the new technology spread quickly worldwide. Another example 407 
refers to phasing out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a spectacular achievement of the Montreal 408 
Time 
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Figure 4 An example of S-shaped diffusion curve 
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Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.§ In this case, the U.S. decision to sign the 409 
Montreal Protocol hinged on a technological innovation by Du Pont, the world’s largest producer of 410 
CFCs, allowing the company to gain from elimination of CFCs. Again, strategic complementary led 411 
most countries to phase-out ozone-depleting chemicals.  412 
While absent from these early models of diffusion, the role of social contacts (the “channels” in 413 
Rogers, 1995’s definition) in determining the final outcome of diffusion is little disputable. For 414 
instance, the probability that a substantial fraction of the population will get infected by a virus, 415 
initially affecting only a small subset of agents, will largely depend on how densely connected the 416 
network is, on the shape of the degree distribution, and on how these features relate to the specifics 417 
of the infection (how aggressive and contagious it is, how costly immunizing part of society is, 418 
etc…). Similarly, a farmer’s incentive to adopt a new technology will depend on how many of his 419 
neighbors have adopted it, and probably on how profitable the adoption turned out to be. 420 
The theoretical effort devoted to the extension of the basic aggregate models of diffusion to 421 
encompass the role of networks has produced a vast and growing literature. This literature tries to 422 
address issues such as the effect of different network topologies on the speed of diffusion, the role 423 
of mediators and perpetrators, the effect of assortative matching (homophily) on the spread of 424 
information, the role of the costs of diffusion.  425 
In the epidemiology literature, the two main benchmarks are the SIR (Susceptible, Infected, 426 
Recovered) and the SIS (Susceptible, Infected, Susceptible) models of diffusion. In the SIS model, 427 
agents are born healthy (susceptible), get infected with some probability and with some probability 428 
recover, after which they become susceptible of infection again. Here the network topology affects 429 
the probability that an agent gets infected; this is proportional to its degree and to the probability 430 
that one of his neighbours is infected (and also to the rate of disease transmission, measuring how 431 
infectious the disease is but not depending on the network structure). Both the speed of convergence 432 
to steady state with non-zero infection and the overall social extent of the infection depend on the 433 
degree distribution of the network, and on how this topology relates to the rate of transmission (see 434 
Jackson, 2008). 435 
Examining the effect of changes in the degree distribution provides an instructive example of 436 
what one can learn by explicitly modelling the network. First, a first order stochastic dominance 437 
shift in the degree distribution (larger average degree) always increases the speed of diffusion and 438 
the steady state share of infected agents. This result has a very natural intuition: more connections 439 
result in more intense social interaction and in a faster spread of the disease. Second, a shift of the 440 
second order stochastic dominance type (larger fractions of agents with very small and with very 441 
large degrees) has ambiguous effects: while a higher fraction of poorly connected agents should 442 
slow down diffusion, a larger fraction of very well connected agents should speed it up. The net 443 
effect depends on the topology of the network, and on how this topology combines with the degree 444 
of infectiousness of the disease. When infection rates are very high overall, a spread of the degree 445 
distribution results in a decrease in diffusion, and vice versa. An intuition for this result comes from 446 
the non-linear relation between a node’s degree and its probability of infection: already high 447 
infection rates are little sensitive to increases in a node’s degree, simply because infection rates are 448 
bounded above. So, when infection rates are high, the effect of increasing the number of very 449 
connected nodes is small and dominated by the effect of increasing the number of little connected 450 
                                                
§ As of September 2013, 197 countries have ratified the Protocol, banning the production of chlorofluorocarbons, 
halons, and other ozone-depleting chemicals. 
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nodes. By a specular arguments, when the infection is little aggressive a spread in the degree 451 
distribution increases the speed of diffusion, as the effect of more nodes with large degree 452 
dominates the effect of more nodes with very small degree. 453 
Interestingly, similar insights characterize problems with strategic complementarities, where the 454 
probability of taking an action increases with the share (or number) of neighbours taking that same 455 
action. Here as well more connections imply faster diffusion, and the effect of a mean preserving 456 
spread in the degree distribution is ambiguous. Faster diffusion occurs when the incentives to adopt 457 
are very sensitive to the degree of an agent – a similar condition to the one for the SIS model, where 458 
the rate of transmission had to be very sensitive to the degree. A notable difference with respect to 459 
the SIS model is that conditions for large scale spread apply to the size of the initial adopters, which 460 
has to exceed a given threshold in order for diffusion to kick off (an intuitive consequence of 461 
complementarities). 462 
 463 
3.1.2 Evolution of Cooperation in Networks 464 
 465 
Cooperative behaviour and social dilemmas are of great importance in environmental economics. 466 
The stylized and tractable framework of the Prisoner’s Dilemma has spurred an immense literature 467 
trying to assess the potential of socio-economic systems to overcome the inefficiencies of private 468 
incentives. **  In environmental problems, this relates to the ability of a system to preserve 469 
exhaustible natural resources, manage commons and produce public goods. Since cooperative 470 
behaviour (especially within groups) seems to be at the root of successful evolution, despite the fact 471 
that co-operators are themselves, as individuals, under evolutionary pressures, the emergence of 472 
cooperation has traditionally been of interest to evolutionary biologists. Evolutionary models have 473 
then been established as the standard paradigm to study cooperation. A fundamental question in this 474 
body of research is under what conditions cooperation would prevail as a product of evolutionary 475 
dynamics. A useful starting point is the early result showing that when social interaction is 476 
unstructured (the so-called well-mixed matching model, where every agent may interact with every 477 
other agent), natural selection increases the relative abundance of defectors and drives cooperators 478 
to extinction (see, for instance, Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998, Nowa, Sasaki, Taylor and  479 
Fudenberg, 2004). Cooperation is therefore unviable in the long run.  480 
Researchers have then focused on various mechanisms that may generate either partial or 481 
widespread long run cooperation. One of such mechanism is of direct interest to the present survey, 482 
as it focuses on the role of local (or “spatial” or “targeted”) interaction.†† The general idea is that 483 
agents do not observe, or interact with, all other agents in the system, but only with a restricted set 484 
of neighbours. In this framework, local interaction determines both individual payoffs (via the game 485 
being played locally) and the (myopic) payoff comparisons that drive the revision mechanism. The 486 
main finding of this literature is that within such structured populations (described by an incomplete 487 
network), the outcome of evolutionary games can be very different from the one of the well-mixed 488 
case. The early work of Nowak and May (1992) shows that when local interaction takes the form of 489 
a two dimensional lattice, chaotic dynamics may persist in the long run, with both cooperators and 490 
defectors present in non vanishing portion of society. In general, the possibility that cooperation 491 
occurs in the long run has been shown to depend on depend on whether the benefit-to-cost ratio of 492 
                                                
** Other social games that have been studied in the evolutionary literature are the “stage-hunt” and the “snowdrift” 
games, where dominant strategies are absent and dynamics select one out of multiple equilibria. 
†† These also include direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, kin selection and multi-level selection.  
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cooperation exceeds the average number of interactions (Ohtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman, and Nowak, 493 
2006). Moreover,  “diversity” in the degree distribution has been shown to help promote 494 
cooperation. In particular, various studies confirm that scale free distributions (i.e., networks in 495 
which very connected and very little connected agents abound compared to uniform random 496 
assortment) are able to sustain partial cooperation in the long run, independently of the underlying 497 
game being played‡‡ (Alonso-Sanz, 2009, Santos and Pacheco, 2005, Santos, Pacheco, Lenaerts, 498 
2006, Santos, Pinheiro, Lenearts, and Pacheco, 2012, Rand, Nowak, Fowler, Christakis, 2014). 499 
A very recent and insightful line of research is now looking at the effects of the co-evolution of 500 
behaviour and interaction structures. In fact, it seems reasonable to assume that not only behaviour 501 
is affected by the structure of social contacts, but also that this structure may change in response to 502 
experienced behaviour. Agents may in fact try to form or sever links in order to take advantage of 503 
more profitable partners, or to mimic the social contacts of successful neighbours, or just because 504 
their preferences may change due to past interactions. Early attempts to study the coevolution of 505 
network and behaviour have simply assumed that the network itself evolves according to its own 506 
evolutionary dynamics. This approach is found also in more recent papers (see, for instance, Ebel 507 
and Bornholdt., 2002a, Szolnoki and Perc, 2009). 508 
A richer approach fully encompasses the feedback between behaviour and social structure, and 509 
allows the network dynamics to depend on past strategies (see Ebel, and Bornholdt, 2002b, Chen, 510 
Fu, and Wang, L., 2008, Gräser, Xu and Hui, 2009). Skyrms, B. and R. Pemantle (2000) first 511 
suggested how considering the dynamic of the network, as it generates from agents’ linking 512 
decisions, can have substantial effects on the evolution of cooperation compared to models with a 513 
fixed network. Interestingly, a careful examination of these feedbacks has lead to results that are at 514 
odds with previously shared wisdom on what type of social structure promotes cooperation. In 515 
particular, Hanaki et al. (2007) have shown how the survival of a cooperating population requires 516 
sparse networks, little local clustering, and the possibility that agents unilaterally cut unprofitable 517 
ties. This findings are at odds with the prior wisdom that cooperation would develope in closed and 518 
dense communities of cooperators (see Axelrof, 1984, Coleman, 1988). Similar insights underly the 519 
results by Santos et al. (2012), showing that structures that promote cooperation, exhibiting enough 520 
diversity in the degree distribution, can arise by means of agents’ voluntary link revision.  521 
No work to our knowledge has studied the coevolution of the social structure, behavior and 522 
agents’ preferences (such as, for instance, prejudice against diversity or social awareness). This 523 
seems to be a promising direction of research in environmental economics, where environmentally 524 
aware behavior by consumers tends to diffuse according to social relations, and is also likely to 525 
shape (and be itself shaped) by the formation of new social ties.  526 
 527 
 528 
3.1.3 Coevolution of Behavior and Natural Resources 529 
                                                
‡‡ The two main metaphors for the tension between private and collective incentives are the Prisoners’ Dilemma (in 
which defecting is a dominant strategy) and the Snowball Game (also known as “Chicken Game”, in which cooperation 
is a best response to defection and viceversa). For the Snowball Game, Hauert and Doebeli (2004) have shown that 
local interaction may inhibit co-operation rather than promoting it. 
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We end this section with a specific example of what additional insights are obtained by modelling 530 
network interaction in problems of diffusion of behaviour. In particular we consider the evolution of 531 
cooperative behaviour in resource harvesting. Tavoni et al. (2012) and Lade et al. (2013) explored 532 
the effectiveness of social sanctioning of resource overuse in promoting sustainable extraction. Two 533 
types of agents, norm-following co-operators (C) limiting their resource use to the socially optimal 534 
amount, and defectors (D) who extract above the sustainable level, interact in a well-mixed 535 
population (i.e. absent a network structure). Either type, when randomly matched with a fellow user 536 
of the shared resource, updates his or her strategy based on utility differences, according to the 537 
replicator dynamics. A key feature of this model is the explicit consideration of resource dynamics, 538 
which are coupled with behavioural dynamics. Payoffs from harvesting vary depending on the 539 
composition of the population: the higher the share of defectors, the more depleted the resource and 540 
the less effective the sanctions. The results of this a-spatial model, where everyone interacts with 541 
everyone else, are displayed in figure 5 for varying degrees of the parameter ߤ, which captures the 542 
extent of norm violation.§§ Three regimes of stationary state of the evolutionary dynamics obtain: (i) 543 
the defector equilibrium (when the dynamics tend to the left of the figure); (ii) the co-operator 544 
equilibrium (on the right hand side of the figure); and (iii) the mixed equilibrium where both C and 545 
D coexist.  546 
Chung et al. (2013) have enriched this model with an explicit account of the structure of local 547 
interactions, formalized by a social network. The thinner lines in figure 5 show results for a model 548 
where individuals only observe agents in their neighbourhood. Here, the effect of the sanctions 549 
imposed on a norm violator is assumed to depend exclusively on the fraction of co-operators in the 550 
defector’s neighbourhood.*** The figure refers to regular connected networks of 50 nodes, with 551 
degrees of k=40 (solid curve), k = 20 (dashed curve), k = 10 (dotted curve) and k = 2 (dash-dotted 552 
curve). We observe that as the common degree declines, the basin of attraction of the co-operator 553 
equilibrium shrinks, paving the way for a ‘tragedy of the commons’.  554 
                                                
§§ The arrows in the figure indicate the direction in which the composition of the population evolves, so that one can 
determine which equilibrium obtains for a given initial share of co-operators (and the level of defection by norm-
violators). 
*** This is in contrast to the well-mixed population, where all defectors are subject to the same amount of ostracism. 
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 555 
  556 
Interestingly, the joint account of behaviour and resource dynamics generates predictions that are 557 
somewhat at odds with those obtained in models where resource dynamics are absent. While in 558 
such models long run cooperation requires sparse networks and low clustering or, at least, the 559 
presence of many little connected agents (see the previous section for a discussion), here stable long 560 
run cooperation is consistent only with highly connected networks. Further research should qualify 561 
such predictions for non-regular networks, such as scale-free networks, where cooperation has been 562 
shown to be consistent with long run evolutionary selection. 563 
 564 
3.2 Access and Use of Natural Resources 565 
 566 
The access and distribution of natural resources often entails the use of networked infrastructures 567 
and markets. This is the case, for instance, of irrigation water and natural gas. In these examples, 568 
the cost and benefits from the use of the resource is determined by the pattern of canals and 569 
pipelines through which this is sourced and distributed. The efficient use of the resource calls for 570 
agreements and contracts between the nodes of the network, whose gains and benefits are 571 
determined through complex bargaining processes. The network itself is, to some extent, flexible, as 572 
new links can be created and existing links destroyed in pursue of larger profits. The incentives to 573 
form or delete a link may well not align with social incentives, as the formation only requires the 574 
consent of the two interested nodes, and the deletion often only requires the consent of one of the 575 
interested nodes. Due to network externalities, inefficient networks may result from the 576 
decentralized formation of links, and a general tension between efficiency and stability has been 577 
recognized in early works of network economics (see Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996). Two issues 578 
seem to be of prominent interest for the application of network economics to natural resources: how 579 
players will share the gains from cooperation through bargaining, and how this will affect, and be 580 
affected, by the degree of flexibility of the network and the incentives to form and delete links. 581 
Figure 5 Co-existence of co-operators and defectors in a well-mixed 
population (thick solid curve) and in regular networks with decreasing 
average degree. ߤ ∈ ሺ1,3.5ሻ is the degree of defection relative to C, and 
௖݂ is the frequency of C-types.  Source: Chung et al., 2013. 
 17
In this section we discuss these issues using, as an illustrative example, the case of the Eurasian 582 
natural gas pipelines. Eurasian gas accounts for 40% of EU gas imports, and most of these imports 583 
transit through Belarus or Ukraine, both importing gas from the Russian Federation (see figure 6).  584 
 585 
 586 
 587 
A striking example of the stark consequences of failures in the bargaining process is provided by 588 
the 2009 crisis, where the disagreement on gas prices and fees led to interruptions of supply through 589 
Ukraine for several weeks (see Hubert and Cobanli, 2012). Such retaliatory behaviour can be 590 
viewed as an attempt to build-up bargaining power out of strategic and vital positions in the 591 
transmission network. In general, players’ bargaining power (and, with it, their final payoff) will 592 
depend on their position in the pipeline network, together with other factors such as market size, 593 
production capacity and international power. Recent contributions in network theory have provided 594 
a framework to study bargaining processes among agents located on a network. These are mainly 595 
buyer-seller networks, in which a player bargaining power depends, in a complex manner, on her 596 
connections to other nodes on other side of the market, and on the connections of these nodes. 597 
However, distribution networks generally have a more complex structure than buyer-seller 598 
networks. Specifically, they are characterized by directed links and present strong heterogeneities 599 
among players; incorporating these features within a fully-fledged non cooperative bargaining 600 
model is a challenging, yet necessary task for future research. 601 
Adopting an alternative approach, based on cooperative game theory, Hubert and Cobanli 602 
(2012) have studied the specific problem of Eurasian gas pipelines network. This approach relies on 603 
a variation of the Shapely Value for games with a communication structure, that is, games where 604 
agents’ cooperation possibilities are described by a network. This variant, first proposed by 605 
Myerson (1977), is based on a description of coalitional values that take into account the limits to 606 
cooperation imposed by the fixed network structure. Using the notation developed in section 2, we 607 
let ݃|ௌ be the sub-network obtained by only considering nodes in S and those links for which at 608 
least one of the involved nodes belongs to S. Let also ܥሺ݃|ௌሻ be the set of components of ݃|ௌ, and 609 
let ߨሺ݃|ௌሻ be the partition obtained by considering the set of nodes of the components in ܥሺ݃|ௌሻ. 610 
Given a primitive characteristic function ݒሺܵሻ describing the payoff possibilities of each coalition S, 611 
Figure 6 Eurasian pipeline gas network. Source: Hubert and Cobanli 
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we can define the new value function ݒ௚ ൌ ∑ ݒሺܤሻ஻∈గሺ௚|ೄሻ	 . This function captures the fact that 612 
players without links in g are not able to coordinate their actions unless indirectly connected by 613 
other players who transmit the necessary information. So, the coalition S is only able to generate a 614 
value equal to the sum of values generated by its connected components. The marginal 615 
contributions that enter the computation of the Shapley value are, of course, affected by the 616 
network. In particular, players who are vital for many connected components, end up having very 617 
large marginal contributions and, therefore, a large Shapley value. This, in turn, implies that players 618 
who act as connectors in the network will be allocated a relatively large share of the aggregate 619 
payoff. Within the context of the Eurasia pipeline network, the resulting allocation rule is such that 620 
those countries that, if removed from the network, would impede the flow of gas from sources to 621 
users, such as Belarus and Ukraine, have a strong bargaining power. 622 
The outlined relation between the network architecture and players’ bargaining power can help 623 
interpret recent developments in the (planned) infrastructures of gas distribution. These include: (i) 624 
the offshore twin-pipeline Nord Stream, which establishes a direct link between Russia and 625 
Germany through the Baltic Sea; (ii) the South Stream pipeline, providing a direct connection 626 
between Russia and Bulgaria, from where gas should flow to Central Europe, Italy and Turkey; and 627 
(iii) the Nabucco project which should open a corridor through Turkey, thus connecting Europe to 628 
new suppliers in the Middle East and the Caspian region. If implemented, these projects would 629 
considerably weaken the bargaining position of Belarus and Ukraine, reshaping the power along the 630 
network at the advantage of Russia and Europe. In terms of network economics, the very fact that 631 
these projects are being planned or undertaken suggest that the current configuration of pipelines 632 
does not constitute a “pairwise stable” network architecture (see Jackson and Wolinksy, 1996). This 633 
notion of stability would in fact require that no pair of nodes has an incentive to bear the cost of a 634 
new link, and that no node find it profitable to cut any of its links. As in the case of the newly 635 
planned pipelines, such incentives are determined by the expectation of a new payoff allocation 636 
following the creation or deletion of a link. This makes clear that a better understanding of the 637 
economics and strategy of networked resources would call for an analysis of network formation, 638 
itself based on a careful assessment of incentives to form and sever links, of the associated costs 639 
and gains in bargaining power, and of the consequences for the system as a whole. This seems to be 640 
a challenging and exciting area for future research. 641 
 642 
3.3 Common-pool Resource Management and Governance 643 
 644 
The collective management of natural resources is increasingly being recognised as a critical 645 
dimension of sustainable development and a key determinant of economic performance, especially 646 
in the rural sector of developing economies (Platteau, 1991; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 647 
2003; Baland et al., 2006; Bardhan et al., 2006). By its nature, collective action involves 648 
interdependency among individuals. For example, the maintenance of an irrigation network requires 649 
the stabilization of the rims and the desalting of minor channels across farmers' land. 650 
Interdependency, combined with the non-excludable and rival nature of many natural resources, 651 
poses significant challenges and raises the question of whether individuals are capable to coordinate 652 
their action and successfully manage resources held in common. 653 
The conventional theory of collective action – centred on the powerful metaphor of the tragedy 654 
of the commons (Hardin, 1968), the Prisoner's Dilemma game, and the free-riding problem (Olson, 655 
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1965) – offered a pessimistic yet influential answer to this question, that has for long dominated the 656 
way in which social scientists thought about shared resources (Ostrom et al., 1999). Over the past 657 
decades, however, scholars from different disciplines and backgrounds have shown that the tragedy 658 
of the commons is not inevitable, and individuals have the potentials to act collectively.††† The 659 
recognition that collective action is possible has, in turn, shifted the attention of more recent 660 
research towards the question of why collective action emerges and under which conditions it is 661 
more likely to succeed or fail. Within this context, a number of structural variables have been 662 
identified as critical for the successful management of common-pool resources. These include 663 
institutional arrangements concerning monitoring, sanctions and accountability; group 664 
characteristics related to size, levels of wealth, and social capital; attributes of the social 665 
environment and of the resource system, such as the social cohesion and the networked structure of 666 
groups, well-defined boundaries, unpredictability of resource flows, and resource mobility. 667 
While the first two sets of variables – i.e. institutional arrangements and group characteristics – 668 
have been studied extensively both theoretically and empirically, our understanding of factors 669 
related to resource characteristics and the role of social networks is still relatively limited. Yet the 670 
physical complexity of natural resources may have important implications for whether and how 671 
users can sustain effective institutions. For example, as water moves through a landscape, 672 
hydrological attributes such as quantity, quality, location and timing, are likely to be influenced by 673 
land use and vegetation patterns. The interconnected nature of the hydrological cycle, thus, implies 674 
that many actors and sectors influence water resources at different geographic scales and 675 
administrative levels of governance.  676 
In this section we will discuss recent contributions and possible advances in two of the above 677 
aspects of the management of common resources, both calling for a network perspective: multiple 678 
commons and multi-level governance in the water sector. 679 
 680 
3.3.1 Networks of Commons 681 
 682 
Most models of commons assume that there exists a single source exploited by many users. In 683 
fact, the most representative commons (e.g. forests, pastures, and groundwater resources) are local, 684 
but numerous. The multiplicity of sources can raise interesting political and economic questions. 685 
For example, the severe drought that affected Spain in 2006-2007 led the government to consider 686 
the possibility of transferring water from the north to the south through the construction of new 687 
pipelines. This proposal gave rise to a political debate about regional and national sovereignty over 688 
water resources, and the potential economic and environmental consequences of water transfers. 689 
A first important step towards the analysis of common-pool resource problems with multiple 690 
sources was recently made by İlkiliҫ (2011). In this paper, the author considers a situation in which 691 
n (water) sources ݏଵ, ݏଶ, … , ݏ௡ and m cities ܿଵ, ܿଶ, … , ܿ௠ are embedded in a network that links cities 692 
with sources. Figure 7 provides two examples of possible network structures in the case of two 693 
cities and two sources.  The first graph, describes a complete network where each user is linked 694 
with both sources, while in the second graph, ܿଶ is connected only to ݏଶ. 695 
 696 
                                                
††† Examples of cooperative behaviour have been identified in a wide range of contexts. These include the management 
of fisheries (e.g., Acheson, 2003; Singleton, 1999), forests (e.g., Mckean, 1986, 2000; Schoonmaker Freudnberger 
1993), pastures (e.g., Gilles et al. 1992; Netting, 1981; Nugent and Sanchez, 1999), and groundwater resources (e.g., 
Trawick, 2003; Marchiori et al., 2012). 
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 697 
 698 
 699 
The cities receive a value from consumption of the resource, but extraction is costly. Water 700 
consumption has linear benefits; extraction costs are convex, and are composed of a private part, 701 
which depends quadratically on total extraction by the city, and of a part that is source specific and 702 
is subject to a congestion effect. Specifically, city ݆’s utility takes the following form: 703 
 704 
ݑ௝൫ܳ௚൯ ൌ ݍ௝ െ ௤ೕ
మ
ଶ െ ∑ ݍ௜௝ݍ௜௦೔∈ே೒ሺ௖ೕሻ . 705 
 706 
where ݍ௜௝ is the amount of water extracted by city ௝ܿ from source ݏ௜, ݍ௝ is the total amount extracted 707 
by ௝ܿ, and ݍ௜ is the total amount extracted from source ݏ௜. So, a city’s extraction from a given source 708 
has a negative cost externality on all other users of that same source. There is therefore no physical 709 
externality across sources. In particular, this implies that a model with two sources is different from 710 
a model with one source even when all cities are linked to both sources. 711 
Two important issues in this setting concern the non-cooperative extraction levels when users 712 
freely decide how much to extract from each source they are connected to, and how these levels 713 
compare to the socially efficient use of the sources. A first main contribution of the paper is that 714 
each city’s non-cooperative exploitation of a given source turns out to be proportional to a measure 715 
of Bonacich centrality of the link connecting the city to that source.‡‡‡ Consider, for instance, the 716 
two cities-two sources case of figure 7. It can be shown that, if the network structure is as in graph717 
, the link flows at equilibrium are ݍଵଵ∗ ൌ ݍଶଵ∗ ൌ ݍଵଶ∗ ൌ ݍଶଶ∗ ൌ 0.2. These levels equate marginal 718 
costs across sources for both cities, given the negative cost externality associated with local 719 
extraction. Interestingly, these are equivalent to the levels of extraction that would occur if each city 720 
was linked to a different source only. So, in the complete network agents avoid the cost 721 
inefficiencies by sorting their extraction between the two sources. If the network is incomplete as in 722 
݃ଶ , equilibrium extraction levels at equilibrium are ݍଵଵ∗ ൌ 0.2857 , ݍଶଵ∗ ൌ 0.1429 , and ݍଶଶ∗ ൌ723 
                                                
‡‡‡  Note that while in the traditional model of games on networks, where each node is a player, equilibrium behaviour 
relates to the Bonacich centrality of nodes (see Ballester et al., 2006), here the equilibrium relates to the Bonacich 
centrality of links. This is due to the fact that the city-to-source network is bipartite and only the nodes in one of the two 
independent sets (the cities) are strategic players. 
1g
Figure 7 Two different networks of two cities and two sources 
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0.2857. In this case, ܿଶ – which is now connected only to ݏଶ – exploits this source more than in the 724 
complete network. This, in turn, makes the extractions from ݏଶ more costly, leading ܿଵ to consume 725 
less water from this source and rely relatively more on its exclusive connection ݏଵ. Hence the absent 726 
link between ܿଶ  and ݏଵ  harms ܿଶ  (which is lacking the link) and benefits ܿଵ  (the city that is 727 
connected to both sources). 728 
More generally (and interestingly), in a common-pool resource game with multiple sources, a 729 
user’s extraction at a source does not only depend on the number of users it shares it with. It also 730 
depends on the number of sources that these other users are linked to; and on the number of users 731 
those sources are linked to, and so on. That is, the externality spreads through the network and 732 
across sources, despite the absence of any physical interdependence across sources. 733 
From a policy perspective, the analysis suggests that disregarding the structure of the network 734 
may be misleading, because different structures affect both overall extraction levels and the 735 
distribution of the resource across users and sources. Going back to the previous example, the 736 
complete network ଵ݃ leads to relatively higher overall water consumption. However, the incomplete 737 
structure ݃ଶ is such that ݏଶ is exploited more severely. This, in turn, may have implications for both 738 
the urgency and type of intervention depending on how close to the point of non-recovery is the 739 
resource as a whole, and on the ecological and socio-economic importance of different sources 740 
within the network. 741 
Turning now to the efficient use of the various sources, the paper first shows that all efficient 742 
allocations are characterized by the same aggregate extractions source by source and city by city. 743 
More importantly, it turns out that the efficient use of water in a given network is equivalent to the 744 
efficient use that would result by partitioning cities and sources into independent “regions”. Each 745 
region would comprise a subset of cities together with the sources to which these cities have access 746 
in the network, and within each region the aggregate water use from each source would be the same 747 
as if the region was internally fully connected. This conclusion seems to support a management 748 
approach based on the creation of distinct and independent areas of water exploitation, where 749 
subsets of cities have exclusive access to a subset of sources. 750 
The paper opens the way to salient and challenging questions concerning the use of networked 751 
resources. First, linking cities to sources may be a (costly) policy decision. The crucial question is 752 
therefore which networks are socially efficient in this case, and whether agents would indeed form 753 
the efficient links in a decentralized link formation game. Efficiency is a property of link formation 754 
in the two sided problem studied by Kranton and Minehart (2001), and it would be interesting to see 755 
whether those results apply to problems with local congestion. Second, many real life instances 756 
where multiple commons are relevant present spillovers across sources. We think, for instance of 757 
the complex interplay between groundwater and surface water, but also of catchment areas in 758 
fisheries. Finally, cities and sources may be heterogeneous, in costs and sizes, and this would 759 
naturally induce heterogeneous extraction levels and efficient architectures. 760 
 761 
3.3.2 Multi-level Governance in the Water Sector 762 
 763 
The inherent complexity of water governance is due not only to the interconnectedness of the 764 
hydrological cycle, but also to the multiplicity and variety of actors affecting water resources at 765 
multiple levels. Responses to water problems are often based on top-down centralised approaches, 766 
generally poorly suited to deal with the socio-political and ecological complexities underpinning 767 
water use and management (Pretty and Ward, 2001; Molle et al, 2007). The emerging new 768 
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frameworks for governing water see national governments increasingly devolving decision-making 769 
responsibility to local authorities and encouraging stakeholders’ participation. The underlying 770 
rationale is that involving actors at different levels can lead to improved accountability of 771 
stakeholders, higher legitimacy of the decisions, and management strategies that are better adapted 772 
to local conditions (e.g. Marchiori et al., 2012). 773 
Researchers in environmental policy distinguish between a ‘vertical’ and a ‘horizontal’ 774 
dimension of governance, where the former refers to the linkages between higher and lower levels 775 
of government, including institutional, financial, and informational aspects; the latter refers to 776 
cooperative arrangements between a range of public and private actors in the formulation and 777 
adoption of development strategies. Recent research has stressed how, by shaping the functioning of 778 
such arrangements, social networks can either facilitate or hinder the implementation of and the 779 
compliance with environmental regulations. Researchers have argued that social ties of various 780 
kinds, ranging from information transmission channels to power relations, social emulation, market 781 
interaction, kinship, funding, collaboration etc., can be more important than formal decision making 782 
structures for the success of environmental cooperation (see, for instance, Olsson, Folke and, 783 
Hughes, 2008).  784 
In the specific case of water management, using a network approach to assess the effectiveness 785 
of policies involves two steps: first, identifying all the actors that directly and indirectly influence 786 
the complex process of water resource use; second, mapping their formal and informal relations. 787 
Direct influence means that an actor directly modifies water flows through withdrawals and 788 
discharge activities, flow control measures and land use. Other actors may exert an indirect 789 
influence by affecting the activities of those who use water directly. Think, for example, of a 790 
governmental body that provides funding for the construction of a new irrigation scheme. 791 
To date, empirical research applying quantitative network analysis to natural resource 792 
governance is still relatively limited. Yet, some valuable insights and hypotheses have started to 793 
emerge in this evolving field. Three features of the networked social structure seem to deserve 794 
special attention in future research: network density, network centrality and the co-evolution of 795 
network and behaviour. We briefly discuss some of the insights coming from existing studies and 796 
the potential role of network economics in advancing our understanding of these issues. In fact, 797 
while the existing research has provided convincing arguments for the importance of explicitly 798 
considering social networks in the study of natural resource management, a rigorous and careful 799 
analysis of the various trade-offs involved is still missing. The “economics” approach, based on the 800 
construction of fully fledged behavioural models together with explicit notions of equilibrium 801 
should prove useful in providing clear and theoretically founded predictions of the role of the 802 
network topology for cooperative behaviour, and of the evolution of the network itself. 803 
 804 
Network Density. The hypothesis that a more connected society would imply greater potential 805 
for collective action is supported by many studies in the natural resource governance literature. 806 
Apart from the obvious observation that in order to cooperate on some issue some type of social 807 
contact is needed, the general idea is that more connections should enhance collaboration, ease 808 
monitoring and punishment, and help actors avoid conflicts and develop effective management 809 
strategies (see, for instance, Olsson, Folke and Berkes, 2004). In the context of rural Kenya, King 810 
(2000) showed that fishermen communities characterised by a higher number of interactions among 811 
themselves and with government officials were relatively better able to deal with a series of 812 
unfavourable developments related to the fishery. Similar results emerge from Conley and Udry 813 
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(2001)’s analysis of agricultural practices in Ghana, where high network density is associated with 814 
the development of new technologies and the diffusion of more sustainable management practices.  815 
However, careful inspection of the processes that govern behaviour on the network suggests that the 816 
intuitive but qualitative insight above may fail. For instance, as shown in Currarini (2007) (see also 817 
section 3.3 below), by increasing the cohesiveness of the group, more connections may increase the 818 
outside option of potential free-riders, undermining the possibilities of cooperation. Moreover, large 819 
density may hinder co-operation by diffusing at a larger scale the information about the benefits of 820 
free riding, preventing therefore the creation of co-operative clusters. This was shown in the context 821 
of a model of evolutionary dynamics with myopic agents by Hanaki et al. (2007). Also, Bodin and 822 
Norberg (2005) have shown how large density in a regular network may induce large correlation in 823 
the strategy of myopic emulative agents, thereby increasing the odds of phase transitions in which 824 
the natural resource is overexploited and possibly exhausted.  825 
 826 
Network Cohesiveness and Clustering. Higher density may often come along with more 827 
cohesiveness and clustering. As we explained in section 2, a cohesive network is one whose 828 
connectedness is little vulnerable to departures of agents or coalitions of agents. In particular, more 829 
cohesiveness means that it takes the departure of large coalitions to break up the network. So 830 
defined, cohesiveness guarantees high free-riding incentives to small defecting groups from a 831 
cooperating coalitions, who face large outside options due to the presence of positive spillovers 832 
(see, again, section 3.3). In this case, cohesivenss is detrimental to cooperation. By the same 833 
spoken, cohesiveness lowers the incentives to defect when spillovers are negative, and facing a 834 
united residual coalition is detrimental to defectors’ payoffs. It has also been shown by Hanaki et al. 835 
(2007) that high clustering can hinder cooperation by limiting the possibility that agents observe 836 
uncorrelated information. Since in their model agents learn and imitate their neighbours, it is best to 837 
observe uncorrelated information, since correlated information will often be biased in favour of the 838 
dominating strategy of “not cooperating” in prisoner’s dilemma situations. This also implies that 839 
large networks, where the structure tends to be sparse both locally and globally, are more 840 
favourable to cooperation than small ones – another counter-intuitive conclusion. In order to better 841 
understand the role of clustering and cohesiveness, one should refer to more complex models of 842 
learning, in which both the imitation and the information acquisition functions of relational ties are 843 
at work. For instance, the promoting role of assortative matching for cooperation (see Watts, 1999, 844 
2002) should be contrasted with its averse effect on the speed of diffusion of information (see 845 
Golub and Jackson, 2012), possibly resulting in the localization of cooperation and innovation in 846 
small and very cohesive groups. 847 
 848 
Centrality. While the notions of density and cohesiveness refer to the overall topology of social 849 
ties, and affect – as we have seen – the overall evolution of cooperation, centrality refers to the role 850 
of individual actors in the network. For example, by occupying certain central positions, some 851 
actors may be able to critically influence other relevant stakeholders, thus favouring (or blocking) 852 
the development of sustainable management initiatives. Stein et al (2011) use the notions of degree 853 
centrality and betweenness centrality (see section 2.1) to identify key players in the complex social 854 
and institutional landscape underpinning water governance in the Mkindo catchment, Tanzania. 855 
Within this context, the network of actors that either directly or indirectly influence water flows is a 856 
diverse set of players, ranging from local resource users and village leaders to higher-level 857 
governmental agencies, universities and NGOs. Results show that village leaders play a brokerage 858 
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role in the network connecting water and land related activities within their respective village and, 859 
to some extent, across villages. The organisations with a formal mandate for the management of 860 
water resources, on the other hand, link across larger segments of the catchment, but are not well 861 
connected to local communities.  862 
In general, identifying the most influential agents in the process of natural resource 863 
management may be more challenging than one would expect, both empirically and theoretically. 864 
Recently, Bonacich centrality has been shown to predict behaviour in the context of peer effects 865 
(Ballester et a., 2006), but behaviour may instead prevail at the periphery of the network when local 866 
negative externalities are present, as shown by Currarini et al., 2014. Empirically, this has been 867 
recorded, for instance, for the case of smoking intensity, which has been shown by Christakis and 868 
Fowler (2002) to be largest for agents far away from the core of the network. Interestingly, 869 
Ballester et al. (2006) have shown that network based policies aimed at reducing socially 870 
undesirable behaviour should target key-players who need not be central in the network. Other 871 
variants of centrality have been recently shown by Banerjee et al. (2013) to be relevant to identify 872 
which agents in a network would, if informed about a financial innovation, have the highest impact 873 
on overall adoption in society. Their study provides important insights on the differences between 874 
adoption and mere endorsement, and how these are related to the probability of diffusion. A similar 875 
analysis could be profitably applied to study the process of adoption of new technologies or 876 
behaviours in the context of natural resource management. This type of analysis would suggest 877 
efficient ways to integrate village leaders into formal water governance systems, and qualify the 878 
benefits of strengthening vertical links between local communities and governmental bodies 879 
operating at the district level. 880 
 881 
Network Dynamics and the Coevolution of Behaviour. As mentioned in sections 3.1.2 and 882 
3.1.3, the existing studies on the role of networks on cooperative behaviour mostly focus on the 883 
evolution of behaviour on a fixed network structure, whose ties govern agents’ interaction. A few 884 
recent papers suggest that the explicit consideration of the co-evolution of behaviour and of the 885 
underlying patterns of interaction may substantially enrich the steady state prediction of 886 
cooperation. Hanaki et. al (2007) study a dynamic system where agents’ behaviour evolves by 887 
means of myopic and local imitation of other agents’ performances, and the network evolves by 888 
means of myopic revisions of existing links. The evolution of social ties is such that co-operators 889 
will sever links with defectors, resulting in co-operators having more interactions and higher 890 
aggregate payoff than defectors. This would sustain cooperation in the long run, provided the 891 
average clustering of the network is low enough for defectors to remain isolated after a link is 892 
severed. The key insight here is that networks where social relations are more intertwined and 893 
clustered may discourage cooperation in the long run, precisely because defectors’ behaviour, 894 
which is more profitable if conducted within a connected group, can be discontinued and isolated 895 
by link severance. As a result, groups of co-operators may survive and even attract isolated 896 
defectors, resulting in the enlargement of the scale of cooperation. In a related paper, Skyrms and 897 
Pemantle (2000) study the evolution of repeated behavior within an evolving network, showing that 898 
the explicit modeling of the network dynamics may qualitatively change the behavioral prediction 899 
in steady state. By only looking at random dyadic relations, and neglecting the role of indirect 900 
relation, this paper neglects important features of networked interaction, but clearly highlights the 901 
importance of co-evolution of behavior and social structure. 902 
 903 
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 904 
 905 
3.4 Networks, Coalitions and International Agreements 906 
 907 
In this section we discuss two issues in international cooperation that would benefit from the 908 
explicit consideration of networks and from the application of notions developed in network 909 
economics. In a nutshell, in section 3.4.1 we discuss new insights on the stability of cooperation 910 
that would obtain from the explicit consideration of countries’ bilateral relations within a 911 
cooperating coalition (here represented by a network). The focus here is on the way in which the 912 
structure of bilateral relations within a cooperating coalition affects its stability. In section 3.4.2 we 913 
consider the process of coalition-building through sequential bilateral contacts, and discuss the 914 
trade-offs between centralization and delegation of these contacts. The focus here is, therefore, on 915 
the formation of a cooperating coalition and on the process that leads to it. 916 
 917 
3.4.1 The Internal Structure of Environmental Coalitions 918 
 919 
A common, yet restrictive assumption in the economic literature of IEAs is that countries are 920 
symmetric. When taken into consideration, asymmetries are typically modelled as differences in 921 
terms of costs and benefits of emission abatement. However, due to their history of political, 922 
economic and cultural interactions, countries may also differ with respect to their relationship and 923 
role within the process of building up cooperation (see Section 3.4.2). Because of these differences, 924 
even within a cooperating coalition, certain countries may find it easy to communicate and agree on 925 
proposals, while other countries may have little, if any, relations. These differences in bilateral 926 
relations within the coalition are likely to characterize countries’ relations should the coalition break 927 
down and, with it, their possibilities of cooperation after the break up. If, for instance, two countries 928 
A and B manage to cooperate within a larger coalition only thanks to the mediation of a third 929 
country C, these two countries would probably find it difficult to cooperate if C were to leave the 930 
coalition.  931 
To put things more formally, we associate with the environmental coalition S a set of (possibly 932 
weighted) bilateral links, expressing, for each pair of countries in S, the strength of their diplomatic, 933 
political and economic relationship. In the simplest case, we may think of a {0,1} undirected 934 
network, where countries either communicate or not within S. The cornerstone of our analysis is the 935 
mechanism described above: by describing countries’ bilateral relations, the network predicts 936 
countries’ cooperation possibilities in case the coalition should break apart. Consider, for instance, 937 
country 2 in the left panel of figure 8, mediating all other bilateral relations; 2’s defection from the 938 
three-country coalition would cause a total breakdown of cooperation, as countries 1 and 3 would 939 
not be able (or would face prohibitively high costs) to communicate. If 2 were to defect from a 940 
coalition internally structured as in the right panel of figure 8, a smaller cooperating coalition with 1 941 
and 3 as members would be possible. 942 
What matters for our argument is the observation that, in the presence of spillovers, what a 943 
country expects to obtain by defecting from a coalition crucially depends on the expected patterns 944 
of cooperation after the defection. Free riding incentives are clearly maximal when the remaining 945 
countries are expected to stay together and continue to cooperate. This is the so-called “delta” 946 
assumption, and leads to the prediction of an endemic instability of cooperation when spillovers are 947 
positive (as in the case of environmental agreements). Free riding incentives are, instead, minimized 948 
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when other countries are expected to stop cooperating altogether after a defection – the “gamma” 949 
assumption – in which case global cooperation has been shown to be possible (see Chander and 950 
Tulkens, 1999). By specifying the internal structure of a coalition, the network pins down countries’ 951 
expectations on post-defection scenarios, and therefore their incentives. For instance, the gamma 952 
assumption is naturally associated with country 2’s defection in network (a) of figure 8, while the 953 
delta assumption would appropriately describe expectations after 1’s and 3’s defections. In general, 954 
the defection of a sub-coalition ܵ ⊂ ܰ  from the set N internally organized according to the 955 
connected network g would be followed by the partition ߨሺ݃|ே\ௌሻ of the remaining players ܰ\ܵ, 956 
where each element of the partition corresponds to a component of the sub-network ݃|ே\ௌ  (see 957 
section 2.1). 958 
By shaping defectors’ incentives, relational networks endow a cooperating coalition with 959 
specific stability properties that depend on the sign of coalitional spillovers. In figure 8, for 960 
instance, the “star” network of the left panel provides all players with lower incentive to defect 961 
under positive spillovers, and with higher incentives under negative spillovers, than the complete 962 
network on the right panel. More generally, adding links to a given network always has the effect of 963 
lowering incentives to defect under negative spillovers, and of increasing these incentives under 964 
positive spillovers. This suggests that minimally connected structures would endow the coalition 965 
with strong stability properties under positive spillovers.  966 
Additionally, a very sparse internal structure would also limit the possibilities of coalitional 967 
members to coordinate on defections. In the star network of figure 8, for instance, countries 1 and 3 968 
would not be able to coordinate on a joint defection, unless they get player 2 involved. This is not 969 
the case in the complete network, where 1 and 3 can autonomously take joint decisions. The effect 970 
of the network on coordination was analysed by Demange (2004) in standard cooperative games 971 
and by Currarini (2007) in games with spillovers. A basic insight is that, under positive spillovers, 972 
sparse networks maximize coalitional stability by both limiting the number and the profitability of 973 
potential defections. Things are more ambiguous under negative spillovers: while sparse networks 974 
limit the number of potential defections, they maximize their profitability, resulting in a trade-off 975 
that leaves space for intermediate structure with average density. 976 
 977 
 978 
 979 
(a) (b) 
Figure 8 Internal structures of a 3-country coalition  
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While the above discussion stresses the role of the relational network in shaping players’ outside 980 
options, there are other ways in which the network is likely to affect players’ bargaining power 981 
within the coalition. In the left panel of figure 8, while under positive spillovers player 2 has a low 982 
outside option due to limited free riding possibilities, he is nevertheless responsible for keeping the 983 
coalition united and, therefore, for generating the gains from cooperation. This should increase its 984 
bargaining power compared to the complete network (right panel), where 2 is not in such a pivotal 985 
position. This is indeed recognized by various allocation rules that take account of the network, 986 
such as the Myerson Value, an extension of the Shapley Value to cases where players’ cooperation 987 
possibilities are described by a network. The main insight here is that while pivotal players enjoy a 988 
stronger bargaining position under negative spillovers, a trade-off obtains under positive ones, 989 
where pivotal players, who play an essential role within the coalition, end up facing low outside 990 
options and, as a result, weaker bargaining power. More research is needed to fully understand the 991 
interplay of the different roles of the network in shaping agents bargaining power, and how this 992 
interplay affects the stability of environmental coalitions. 993 
 994 
3.4.2 Delegation and Centralization in the Build-up of Environmental Coalitions  995 
 996 
The process by which environmental coalitions are formed can be varied and multifaceted, and the 997 
timing and framing of negotiations is likely to matter for the final success of cooperation. In 998 
particular, large coalitions are likely to be built gradually, with a limited number of very committed 999 
members as first signatories, who then adopt various strategies to enlarge the coalition. 1000 
The gradual process through which coalitions are built, and the amount of strategy involved, are not 1001 
the focus of the two main approaches to environmental coalitions, based on the notion of core of a 1002 
cooperative game (see Chander and Tulkens, 1997), or on simultaneous non cooperative models of 1003 
coalition formation (as in Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993 and Barrett, 1994).  In many instances of 1004 
international environmental cooperation, however, one or more countries have played the role of 1005 
perpetrators of the process, either because more inclined to solve global environmental problems, or 1006 
because traditionally playing a leading role in the international arena. Such countries face the task 1007 
of building up a larger coalition by means of several and successive individual contacts with other 1008 
perspective members, through complex negotiation processes. The design of such bilateral contacts 1009 
is a crucial element of cooperation, and attains to the timing of such contacts, their degree of 1010 
centralization and delegation, the personal involvement and commitment of perpetrators and of 1011 
perspective members. The perpetrator may, for instance, opt for multiple and simultaneous contacts 1012 
with most of the other potential members, adopting therefore a centralized procedure of coalition 1013 
building. Alternatively, it may identify a restricted set of players to contact in a first stage of 1014 
negotiation, and delegate to these players the task of further enlarging the coalition.  1015 
Both centralization and delegation have plausible pros and cons. Advocates of centralization 1016 
would probably stress the importance of a widespread use of the authority and charisma of the 1017 
perpetrator, whose central role would be interpreted as signal of its commitment to the cooperation 1018 
process. Delegation would probably be preferred when diplomatic, geographical and historical 1019 
relations between countries are very heterogeneous, and the initial perpetrator would lack the 1020 
necessary information and/or diplomatic strength to successfully negotiate with certain potential 1021 
new members. In these cases, the perpetrator may better serve the final goal of global cooperation 1022 
by delegating the creation of new contacts. 1023 
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The choice between delegation and centralization involves other, less obvious, aspects that are 1024 
strictly related to the economics of cooperation and to the resulting patterns of strategic interaction. 1025 
In this section we discuss such aspects, frame them in a stylized example of coalitional externalities, 1026 
and claim that a general analysis of these issues would greatly benefit from the use of network 1027 
formation theory and from our knowledge of strategic interdependence in networks. To fix ideas, 1028 
consider the following three-player example, developed in full detail in Currarini and Feri (2006). A 1029 
perpetrator i has the task of building up a coalition with two other players, j and k. The benefits 1030 
from cooperation are captured by a partition function v, mapping each partition of the set of players 1031 
into a vector of payoffs, specifying an aggregate payoff for each coalition in that partition. 1032 
Formally, we let v(S,π) denote the value generated by S in the partition π. In our example, we set 1033 
ݒሺሼ݅ሽ, ሼ݅, ݆, ݇ሽሻ ൌ 	ݒሺሼ݆ሽ, ሼ݅, ݆, ݇ሽሻ ൌ 	ݒሺሼ݇ሽ, ሼ݅, ݆, ݇ሽሻ  and ݒሺሼ݆݅ሽ, ሼ݆݅, ݇ሽሻ ൌ 	ݒሺሼ݅݇ሽ, ሼ݅݇, ݆ሽሻ ൌ1034 
	ݒሺሼ݆݇ሽ, ሼ݅, ݆݇ሽሻ	by symmetry. We also assume that the grand coalition {ijk} is efficient, by this 1035 
meaning that it generates a higher aggregate payoff than any other partition of the players’ set: 1036 
ݒሺሼ123ሽ, ሼ123ሽሻ ൒ ∑ ݒሺܵ, ߨሻ, ∀ߨ.ௌ∈గ   1037 
The perpetrator i designs the structure of his contacts with j and k. Either i contacts j and k 1038 
simultaneously, proposing to form a coalition of three players, or sequentially, contacting j first, 1039 
proposing him to join the forming coalition, and delegating him the task of enlarging the coalition 1040 
to k. In other words, i admits j in the coalition, and transfers to j the technology to negotiate with k. 1041 
The assumption that the perpetrator can commit not to contact agent k when delegating to agent j 1042 
the contracting power is crucial and considerably simplifies the equilibrium analysis and allows us 1043 
to get a first very sharp intuition. The two scenarios are illustrated in figure 9..  1044 
 1045 
 1046 
 1047 
In the first centralized scenario, j and k simultaneously receive an offer. For both of them to accept, 1048 
the offered monetary payoff has to exceed the outside option given that the other has accepted. 1049 
These outside options are ݒሺሼ݆ሽ, ሼ݆, ݅݇ሽ ൌ ݒሺሼ݇ሽ, ሼ݇, ݆݅ሽ. If the perpetrator delegates, then player j 1050 
needs to receive at least what he would get by rejecting the offer, which is  ݒሺሼ݆ሽ, ሼ݅, ݆, ݇ሽሻ. Player 1051 
k’s payoff when contacted by j would instead be at least ݒሺሼ݇ሽ, ሼ݅, ݇ሽ , his outside option if 1052 
rejecting to join the coalition. 1053 
Figure 9 Centralised (left) vs. decentralised (right) 
contacts. 
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Summing up, the perpetrator needs to give up different slices of the total cake in the two 1054 
alternative regimes: by centralizing contacts, i gives up  ݒሺሼ݆ሽ, ሼ݆, ݅݇ሽ ൅ ݒሺሼ݇ሽ, ሼ݇, ݆݅ሽ; by delegating, 1055 
i gives up ݒሺሼ݆ሽ, ሼ݆, ݅, ݇ሽሻ ൅ ݒሺሼ݇ሽ, ሼ݇, ݆݅ሽ . Which regime is preferred by the perpetrator clearly 1056 
depends on whether ݒሺሼ݆ሽ, ሼ݆, ݅, ݇ሽ ൐ ݒሺሼ݆ሽ, ሼ݆, ݅݇ሽ or, instead, ݒሺሼ݆ሽ, ሼ݆, ݅, ݇ሽ ൏ ݒሺሼ݆ሽ, ሼ݆, ݅݇ሽ. In the 1057 
terminology of coalitional games, it depends on whether agents face negative or positive coalitional 1058 
spillovers. In particular, the perpetrator will prefer centralized contacts when spillovers are 1059 
negative, and sequential contacts when spillovers are positive. Also, when there are intrinsic 1060 
reasons to centralize contacts (based, as we said, on the perpetrator authority), there is a trade-off 1061 
between these reasons and the strategic incentives to free ride in a centralized process, and this 1062 
trade-off may be resolved in favour of delegation the stronger free riding incentives and/or the 1063 
weaker the perpetrator’s authority. 1064 
The role of externalities on outside options, bargaining power and the resulting structure of 1065 
contracts has been stressed in various papers in the contracts literature. Genicot and Ray (2006) 1066 
suggest that the presence of negative externalities may induce the principal to first contract a subset 1067 
of players, and then extend contracts to other individual players – a sort of divide and conquer 1068 
strategy. Similar insights are present in Galasso (2008). The main insight here is that the first set of 1069 
contracts has the purpose of decreasing the outside options of the remaining players, who are then 1070 
contracted at better conditions for the principal. The reason why a fully centralised structure is not 1071 
optimal in these papers is that players can coordinate before responding to the principal’s offer. 1072 
Another difference with our stylized example above is that the principal cannot commit to 1073 
transferring the contracting power to the agents. A similar mechanism underlies the analysis of 1074 
centralized contracts with externalities by Segal (1999), where is shown that positive externalities 1075 
may induce the principal to delegate inefficiently low activity levels, in the attempt to lower agents’ 1076 
outside options and retain a larger share of the social surplus. A general setting that extends the 1077 
three-player example described above to many agents is the sequential “link formation and 1078 
bargaining” game in Currarini and Morelli (2000). There, the sequential formation of links has been 1079 
shown to induce efficiency in the absence of externalities, thus overlooking the free riding 1080 
incentives and their effects on coalition formation. Also, although in that paper the principal can 1081 
decide whether to simultaneously offer a link to all agents or to delegate to the second agent in the 1082 
protocol the task to form further links, the principal cannot retain the exclusive right to propose 1083 
contract. The centralized contracting situation realizes therefore only if all agents reciprocate the 1084 
principal’s link offer and do not form links among themselves. 1085 
 1086 
4 Conclusions 1087 
 1088 
In this paper we have discussed how network economics can help to model and analyse a variety of 1089 
environmental problems, and what new insights can result. In this final section, we wish to offer 1090 
some further thoughts on the relationship between network density and cooperative behaviour; an 1091 
issue, which arises, in one way or another, in all the applications we have considered in this survey. 1092 
Specifically: what type of local interaction promotes cooperative (and socially efficient) behaviour? 1093 
Are dense networks more conducive to cooperation than sparse one? Is symmetry in social relations 1094 
beneficial to pro-social behaviour? In section 3.1, we have seen how the use of evolutionary game 1095 
theoretic models has lead to the conclusion that cooperation is harder to sustain in large 1096 
populations. This is due to the large benefits from defection when the number of interactions 1097 
increases. Hence, this is not a statement about the size of overall population, but rather one about 1098 
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the number of social relations. Increasing population size with a constant number of interactions 1099 
(that is, decreasing network density), does not affect the defectors’ incentives; however, as pointed 1100 
out by Coleman (1988), the degree of clustering (or closure) in social relations matters for 1101 
cooperation, as mutual acquaintances provide reinforcement and monitoring of virtuous behaviour. 1102 
Jackson et al. (2011) reach a similar conclusion in a fully fledged game theoretical model of favor 1103 
exchange, which shows that forward looking rational agents cooperate only if they share one or 1104 
more common neighbors. So, a larger total population may hinder cooperation if it comes at the 1105 
cost of lower clustering. This common view has been challenged by works, such as Hanaki et al. 1106 
(2007), where sparseness is claimed to promote cooperation by favoring the enlargement of 1107 
cooperative groups to defectors. Here the main force promoting large-scale cooperation is the 1108 
asymmetry of social relations, so that isolated defectors may turn into co-operators by imitating 1109 
well-connected (and happier) co-operators. Arguments in favour of asymmetries in the network 1110 
structure also come from other recent papers, where scale free distributions are found to favour pro-1111 
social behaviour (see section 3.1.2). In section 3.4 we have then discussed a different mechanism 1112 
relating the density of a network of cooperators with the stability of cooperation. We have there 1113 
studied a construct where the components of a network represent groups of cooperators (the 1114 
“coalitions” of cooperative game theory), endowed with an internal structure of bilateral relations. 1115 
We have argued that the topology of a component affects the incentives of its members to break out 1116 
by shaping their outside options. This happens when defectors use the network topology to predict 1117 
future cooperative scenarios after their defection. Dense networks, robust to the deletion of nodes, 1118 
favor defectors in public good games, where the disruption of cooperation would act as a 1119 
punishment, and are therefore little apt to sustain cooperation. A similar insight is present in Hanaki 1120 
et al. (2007), where high clustering prevents cooperation by limiting the possibility of individual 1121 
agents to exclude defectors from the benefits of interacting with cooperators. By the same token, 1122 
when the disruption of cooperation is beneficial for defectors, as in pure conflict or bargaining 1123 
games, dense network structures promote cooperation by ensuring that some cohesive structure will 1124 
endure after the defection of one or more players. In sum, the nature of the relationship between 1125 
network density and cooperation ultimately depends on the type of interaction at work: high density 1126 
tends to favor cooperative behavior when spillovers are negative across groups (the typical case in 1127 
environmental games), and to hamper it when spillovers are positive. 1128 
Local interaction and network structures seem to bear potential applications in other environmental 1129 
problems that we have not covered here, including multi-issues environmental negotiations, issue 1130 
linkage, trans-boundary pollution problems, biodiversity and conservation, peer effects in health 1131 
related behaviour with externalities (such as smoking), fisheries management, risk assessment and 1132 
others. We hope that the present paper can stimulate research on these topics, both theoretical and 1133 
applied, explicitly embedding networks in the traditional models of environmental economics. 1134 
Some of these applications are the subject of our current research. 1135 
 1136 
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